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Hungarian Historical Hysteria;
Analyzing the Deployment of Hungarian National History by Viktor Orbán and the
FIDESZ Party
Kris Bohnestiehl
How powerful are the people in a democracy? When the votes are cast and
elections have run their course, what role do the people serve? On January 6th of 2021,
thousands of Americans descended upon the United States Capitol intent on testing the
reaches of their power. Fueled by nationalist and populist rhetoric by then President
Donald Trump, these people sought to save their vision of America, a vision steeped in
nationalist folklore and a historical memory which contrasted with their reality. The
Capitol siege represents the first casualties of the Populist war for the heart of America;
however, outside the United States the pressures of Populism have already debilitated
democracies around the world, serving as an even sterner warning for Americans.
The purpose of this paper is to explore the effects of Populism on the decline of
democracy in Viktor Orbán’s Hungary, and specifically the ways in which the national
history of Hungary and its historical memory have been deployed by Mr. Orbán to foster
the creation of his “illiberal democracy”. Over the last decade Mr. Orbán and his party
FIDESZ have dismantled the democratic checks and balances on the power of the
Prime Minister, granting Mr. Orbán near dictatorial power despite the regime still being
classified as a democracy. This dramatic seizure of democratic powers has been
accomplished by the calculated deployment, manipulation, and censorship of Hungarian
historical memory, through which Mr. Orbán has revived the spirit of Hungarian
nationalism and conjured historic threats to this national identity in order to polarize
Hungary from its western neighbors. By harnessing this polarization in elections, Mr.
Orbán and FIDESZ have entrenched themselves as the moralistic savior of Hungary.
Although Hungary is formally a democracy and Mr. Orbán is an elected leader, this
utilization of history has allowed FIDESZ to take control of the collective identity of the
Hungarian nation, and operate as the gatekeepers of what it means to be Hungarian.
Thus the fundamental relationship of a democracy has been shifted, as Mr. Orbán and
his government have unprecedented control of the Hungarian people in a democracy,
where the relationship should be converse.
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When one thinks of political pathbreakers, Eastern Europe tends to lie lower on
the list of innovators. Hungary itself is a nation of only 10 million people, and up until the
reelection of Viktor Orbán to the post of Prime Minister in 2010 the nation had done little
to garner significant international attention. Entering the 21st century, Hungary had one
of the most stable and competitive democracies in Europe, as the 2002 election cycle
had nearly 70% voter turnout, with an independent judiciary and media.1 Today
however, Hungary has a Freedom House Democracy Score of 3.71 out of 7, placing
Hungary in the category of “Hybrid Regime”, meaning that while the regime does
practice some democratic actions such as elections, they are neither free nor fair as the
country slides towards an autocratic future.2 The dramatic about turn of the democratic
fortunes in Hungary over the last decade has been one of the most puzzling
contemporary queries of students of Democracy, since the backslide of Hungary seems
to go in the face of a substantial portion of established democratic theory. While many
point to the 2008 global financial crisis as the catalyst for this backslide, in order to fully
understand the variables which allowed the rise of Hungary’s “illiberal democracy” and
to give some context to those unfamiliar with the history of this country, our story begins
with the foundation of the Kingdom of Hungary nearly a thousand years ago.
The Magyars were a tribal people who were pushed westward by the stronger
tribes of the Steppes, eventually settling in the Carpathian basin in the 9th century. After
a century of western raiding, the tribes were eventually brought together and created
the Kingdom of Hungary in 1000 A.D.. Signified by the crowning of the first Hungarian
King Saint Stephen, the Kingdom of Hungary was a fundamentally Christian kingdom,
and the entwined nature of Church and State was a fundamental aspect of civil society
in the Kingdom. Being a Christian Kingdom, Hungary was heavily involved in the
conflicts between Christians and Muslims to the East, and the Kingdom took great pride
1
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from their role as the frontline defense for the Christians. This pride would eventually
result in their downfall as in 1526 the Hungarians were soundly defeated in the Battle of
Mohács by the Ottoman Empire. Following this defeat portions of Hungarian territory
was taken by the Ottomans, while the rest and majority of Hungarian territory was taken
over by the Austrian Habsburgs and incorporated into their empire.
Under the Habsburgs Hungary was governed semi-autonomously, however any
inkling of a centralized Hungarian state or even independent Hungarian culture was not
to be found. Although a Hungarian Diet managed many local affairs, the Austrian
Emperor remained King of Hungary, and Magyar culture fell in decline with only 40% of
the Hungarian population being fluent in Hungarian by 1840.3 Despite this decline, the
spirit of nationalism was still alive and strong in the minority as evidenced by the
revolutions of 1848. Known as the “Springtime of the Peoples”, the 1848 revolution was
spearheaded by Hungarian nationalists seeking greater autonomy and more cultural
freedoms from their Austrian rulers. The revolution exploded outwards as many other
nationalities encompassed by the Habsburg Empire followed Hungary’s lead and
revolted in the name of nationalism. While the Austrian military swiftly put a stop to the
revolts by 1849 with help from the Russian military, they were unable to quell the
national spirit, which in Hungary’s case would again emerge in 1867 with signing of the
Dual Compromise. Also known as the Dual Monarchy, the compromise reached
between the Habsburgs and Hungarians saw the Empire divided in half into an Austrian
section and a Hungarian section, each to be independently governed and only
answerable to the Emperor.
The national freedoms granted by the Dual Monarchy which included the right to
teach the Hungarian language in schools saw an expansion of Hungarian nationalism.4
However, these new freedoms did not include an independent military, and this golden
age of nationalism came to an abrupt end when Hungary, Austria and Germany were
defeated by the Western Allies in the first World War in 1918. Following the war, the
various nationalities of the Habsburg Empire were made to sign the Treaty of Trianon,
which to this day is one of the central issues of contemporary Hungarian politics. The
3
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treaty itself was humiliating for the various signees, as the terms were all but dictated by
the Western superpowers who oversaw the affair. In effect the treaty established nation
states for the various nationalities encompassed by the deceased Habsburg Empire,
however it excluded any self-determination for these nationalities in the creation of
these states. Hungary in particular was very hard done by the treaty, as the borders of
the new Hungarian state was without nearly two thirds of its old territory including the
province of Translyvenia, and left over 6 million ethnic Hungarians outside of the
borders of the new nation.5 The Treaty of Trianon represents the most significant break
between Hungary and the West, and the resentment fueled by the unfair circumstances
of the treaty has been revived by Mr. Orbán as one of his most prominent political
weapons.
From 1920 to 1946 Hungary operated as an independent state for the first time in
nearly 500 years. During the Second World War Hungary allied itself with the Axis,
however Jews in Hungary were not sent to concentration camps until late in the war
when the government was deposed and replaced with a facist puppet regime by Hitler.
1946 to 1989 saw Hungary deep within the folds of the Soviet Union where it
established itself as a primary nuisance for Stalin and his successors. In 1956
Hungarians took up arms in a revolution against its Soviet rulers, and although the
revolution was brutally suppressed, Hungary became the source of “Goulash
Communism'' which was a more liberal form of Soviet socialism. 1989 saw the fall of the
Soviet Union, and therefore the end of Communism in Hungary. The new Hungarian
republic was formed along western style democratic values and remained a free and
competitive democracy until 2010 with the reelection of Viktor Orbán.

Now to turn the man himself as the history of Viktor Orbán is just as significant to
the story of Hungary’s democratic backslide. In 1989, Viktor Orbán was a young liberal
politician leading the small party named the Alliance of Young Democrats. Struggling to
garner support, in 1995 Orbán switched sides of the aisle and began campaigning on a
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more conservative front as the leader of the Hungarian Civil Party, eventually winning
the seat of Prime Minister and a parliamentary majority in 1998. During this stint Orbán
oversaw Hungary's entrance into NATO, and rolled back Social Security reforms
installed by previous regimes. His time in office ended in relative disgrace as several
corruption scandals in his cabinet prevented his reelection in 2002.
In 2003 following this defeat, Orbán once again showed his opportunistic
malleability as his Hungarian Civic Party formed a coalition with the hardline religious
conservative Christian Democrats to form the Hungarian Civic Union known by its
acronym FIDESZ.6 As the leader of the opposition, Orbán’s platform was based on
undermining the socialist Prime Minister Ferenc Gyursány. While 2006 was not a good
year for FIDESZ in the polls, the 2008 global financial crisis provided the catalyst which
Mr. Orbán and FIDESZ had so desperately hoped for. Riding the tide of dissatisfaction
with both the incumbent government who had so grossly mismanaged the crisis, and
the rising feelings of resentment towards western liberals who had created the crisis in
Hungarian eyes, Mr. Orbán and FIDESZ found success in the 2010 elections on their
platform of rampant Hungarian nationalism and Christian fundamentalism.
Since his reelection in 2010, Viktor Orbán’s illiberal regime has looked distinctly
different from that of 1998-2002, or any regime which has come before. In Mr. Orbán’s
own words his vision of Hungary is as follows:
What is happening today in Hungary can be interpreted as an attempt of
the respective political leadership to harmonize [the] relationship
between the interests and achievement of individuals – that needs to be
acknowledged – with interests and achievements of the community, and
the nation. Meaning, that Hungarian nation is not a simple sum of
individuals, but a community that needs to be organized, strengthened
and developed, and in this sense, the new state that we are building is
an illiberal state, a non-liberal state. It does not deny foundational values
of liberalism, as freedom, etc.. But it does not make this ideology a
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central element of state organization, but applies a specific, national,
particular approach in its stead.7
What does this “harmonized relationship” between the individual and the
community look like in practice under Orbán? Having campaigned on a platform of
Christian nationalism, Orbán has exerted his full power and even beyond to transform
the Hungarian community and identity into a secular Christian state, where the goals of
the individual align with the greater Christian agenda of the nation. The result of this has
been the near totalitarian control of Hungarian ethos and identity by Orbán, as the state
seeks to transform the Hungarian people into a confirming identity with Hungarian and
Christian values. To oversee and control this identity, FIDESZ have dismantled various
democratic checks on the executive power of Mr. Orbán, including the independence of
the judicial branch and that of the media, and official FIDESZ history is now being
taught in schools.8
Mr. Orbán and FIDESZ have also utilized select censorship to enforce their
envisioned identity by silencing and imprisoning critics to the regime. The most prolific
example of this is the “Child Sex Abuse Law” which was passed in Hungarian
Parliament in June of 2021 despite significant international outcry. The law itself was
initially designed to deal with public outrage over a series of child sex scandals involving
several FIDESZ cabin members, but has taken on a new form to limit the expression of
the LGBTQ community in Hungary. In several hurriedly added clauses, the law
designates homosexuality and any content which promotes gender non-conformity as
“not reccomended for those under 18 years of age”, and as actively promoting
anti-Hungarian sentiment.9 Since Hungary is a Christian nation the government has
enabled itself to take action against any behavior they deem as non-Christian.
The people which Mr. Orbán and his regime represent is an imagined community
of collective Hungarian identity, whose values and traditions are collectively defined.
While Mr. Orban and FIDESZ claim to represent the Hungarian people, they hold the
7
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power to decide the scope of that identity and can exclude or villainize any cultural or
traditional phenomena that does not conform to their view. While clinging desperately to
the title of democracy which remains a precondition for membership to the European
Union, Mr. Orban and FIDESZ have reversed the fundamental relationship between the
people and their democratically elected government, as the regime now has the power
to dictate the national identity of Hungary to the people, as opposed to that identity
sourcing from the people and projecting onto their government. This transition has been
accomplished through Mr. Orbán’s mastery of creating a polarized identity with a
prominent tool: Hungary’s historical memory.
“In the land of Hungary the moon rides high above the lofty mountains, above spreading
plains, above cities where mosques of the Crescent darken with their shadows
cathedrals of the Cross.”10
In order to comprehend Viktor Orbán’s successful manipulation of Hungarian
history it is important to first establish the characteristics which differentiate Eastern
European national collective identity from Western conceptions. While many Western
European states inside the EU have begun to embrace a more pan-European identity
which defines their collective identity as civilizationally “European”, the collective identity
of Eastern European states such as Poland and Hungary have remained rooted in a
sense of pure nationalism. The polarization taking place in broader Europe, which pits
“European Civilization” against encroaching “foreign influences” such as Islam, has
played out differently in Hungary and the rest of Eastern Europe where polarization is
drawn along lines of cultural and societal levels nationally-defined rather than as the
broader nature of European civilization.11
Viktor Orbán’s deployment of this national identity has been masterful, and using
established populist methods he has succeeded in polarizing Hungarian’s and their
national identity from their neighbors. In order for a populist to succeed, three variables
10
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must be present: a polarized population, an existential normative threat to that
population’s existence, and a charismatic leader to guide the threatened people to
safety.12 To achieve these goals Mr. Orbán has utilized the historical memory of
Hungarian identity in three distinct ways: callbacks to a glorious past, the revival of
timeless threats, and the deployment of traditional scapegoats to deflect negative
attention. Working together these three methods have successfully polarized
Hungarians from their international neighbors, emphasized existential threats to this
polarized identity, and situated Mr Orbán as the charismatic savior of the Hungarian
people.
The first way which Viktor Orbán and FIDESZ deploy the historical memory of
Hungary is by invoking a glorious mythical past which modern Hungarians can identify
with. However before moving forward it must be established that the revival of historical
symbols and identities has been a commonplace practice in many post-Communist
states in Eastern Europe, and Hungary was no different before the rise of FIDESZ. A
prominent example of this is the use of the ancient Crown of Hungary as a symbol of
the modern state’s power. The crown was used in the coronations of Hungarian Kings
since the first King Saint Stephen, and today sits in the Parliament building where it has
been for over 20 years, signifying the continuity of power and values which the young
nation shares with that ancient kingdom.
While not a new phenomena, Viktor Orbán has accelerated the process of revival
and has conflated this search for identity with a poll driven agenda in a process known
as mnemonic populism. Mnemonic populism means a pole driven, manifestly
moralistic, anti-pluralist imaginings of the past, which seeks to divide people based
around their imagination of this conjured past identity.13 What Mr. Orbán wants to invoke
in the Hungarian community is the secular traditional Christian identity of the old
Kingdom of Hungary, an identity he claims has been suppressed for generations but
has been reawakened in his illiberal state. In his speeches to the Hungarian people,
Viktor Orbán speaks of a lost vocation or a greater purpose, stating: “We Hungarians
12
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have always thought that we were not just born into the world. If you were born
Hungarian, you also have a mission.”14 Emphasizing the damage of the global financial
crisis which had humbled all of Europe to the shortcomings of the liberal capitalist
system, and supplementing this with the rising anger around the influx of refugees from
the east, Mr. Orbán lays out his vision for Hungary.
In this European situation, it is clear to Hungarians what our European
vocation is. To bring the uncompromising anti-communist tradition into
the common European treasury... to show the beauty and
competitiveness of the political and social order based on Christian
social teachings. To understand... that there is a Christian model of
social organization in Central Europe that is based on teachings and is
independent of the weakening or overturning of personal faith.15
To revive this idealized lost identity, Mr. Orbán and FIDESZ have emphasized
symbols and characteristics of continuity between the past and present, while also
seeking new avenues to inflate this identity. This manifests itself in a variety of forms
such as monuments and idols such as the Holy Crown of Hungary, or dramatized and
picturesque “recreations” of early Hungarian society found in school textbooks and
museums.16 However this manipulation can take several other forms. A favorite
technique of FIDESZ has been the use of state sponsored researchers to “discover”
new connections between the old Kingdom and the current regime, or bolst the sense of
national pride. For example, history textbooks for students in the 5th grade in Hungary
contain this gem of historical inaccuracy: “According to our ancient legends, Hungarians
are related to the Huns…. But linguists list Hungarian as a Finno-Ugric language…. The
archaeologists cannot say anything definitive about the origins of the Hungarian people
because, on the basis of the objects found in those graves, we can’t determine what
language people spoke.”17 The study which is referenced as proof for this data is even
brash enough to claim that : “The Hungarians formed a tribal union but arrived in the
frame of a strong centralized steppe-empire under the leadership of prince Álmos and
14
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his son Árpád, who were known to be direct descendants of the great Hun leader
Attila”.18 Despite any “new” evidence which has been uncovered by researchers, the
Finno-Ugric origins of the Magyars has been established fact for decades, and the basis
for these new claims is self-stated: legends.19
A similar study conducted around the original crowning of Saint Stephen the first
King of Hungary speaks to the underlying goals of FIDESZ’s use of history. In 2020
Hungarian historian György Szabados in association with the FIDESZ government
published a report stating that the crowning of Saint Stephen had not occurred in the
city of Esztergom as had been believed. Rather Szabados declared that the actual sight
of the coronation was in Székesfehérvár (Fehérvár), which happens to be the birthplace
of one Viktor Orbán.20 In an almost biblical fashion, FIDESZ are trying to situate Viktor
Orbán as the heir to the second coming of the lost Hungarian Kingdom, establishing him
as the gatekeeper and ultimate source of this ancient Hungarian identity.
As the gatekeeper, Mr. Orbán can decide who can be identified as Hungarian,
and who can be excluded. This has created an interesting situation in the territories
which were lost by Hungary in 1920 through the Treaty of Trianon, most prominently in
the borderland of Translyvenia. For hundreds of years after the formation of the
Kingdom of Hungary, Transylvania remained a semi-independent crownland which
managed local affairs through a Diet. Due to the extreme rural nature of the territory,
both industrial development and any sense of national sentiment were very slow to
emerge in Transylvania, with the area gaining the reputation in Europe of a folklorish
fairy land untouched by the modern world.21 In 1920 Hungarian influence was cut off to
Translyvenia, as the Treaty of Trianon placed the territory inside of the borders of the
new state of Romania. Although in their own words, the majority of people living inside
Transylvania identify as neither Hungarian or Romanian, the people inside Hungary
protested strongly to what they felt was the separation of millions of ethnic Hungarians
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from their nation.22 The interwar period did not see much development of a national
sentiment inside of Transylvania, as the population formed a diverse community
uninterested in higher politics, as class took precedence over ethnicity in the
community.23
Thus Translyvenia remained without a strong national attachment through 1989,
and ethnic Hungarians within Translyvenia rejected the “meaningless” Romanian
citizenship they were offered. However these disgruntled Hungarians were not without
hope, as in 2004 a referendum vote was held to give citizenship to any Hungarian
nationals living outside the borders. The newly formed FIDESZ campaigned strongly for
the referendum, and when it eventually failed FIDESZ began leveling attacks against
the political left who had voted no, stating that they had betrayed the nation and
abandoned the Hungarian people.24 When he again reached the post of Prime Minister
in 2010, one of Mr. Orbán’s first actions was to decree citizenship for all those
marooned nationals. The vision of a greater Hungary expands past the borders of the
state, and Mr. Orbán has promised to bring them home.
For a Populist to succeed, the three aforementioned factors of polarization,
normative threats, and a charismatic leader must all be present. By reviving the lost
identity of Hungarian nationals and championing himself and FIDESZ as the leaders of
this identity, Viktor Orbán has succeeded in creating a nation polarized from its
neighbors, and has provided a charismatic leader for the nation in the form of himself. In
order to legitimize this new identity and his totalitarian hold over it, Mr. Orbán has
revived historical threats to this reawakened identity in order to justify his illiberal
response. Convincing Hungarians that their way of life is under threat has allowed Mr.
Orbán to take drastic illiberal measures in the name of protecting Hungary and its
values. To convince Hungarians of this looming danger, Mr. Orbán has again turned to
history by emphasizing historical threats to Hungarian identity whose influences are still
prominent today, namely Western colonialism and the threat of an Islamic invasion in
the Christian state of Hungary.
22
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Hungarian history provides a multitude of ideological enemies for Mr Orbán to
invoke as a modern existential threat, however one stands out above the rest, the
injustice imparted in Hungary by the Western powers through the Treaty of Trianon. The
loss of territory has resulted in a long history of hostility between Hungary and the
neighboring states which absorbed the lost territory such as Romania and Germany, but
in the last decade Mr. Orbán has shifted the focus of this anger towards the Western
states who put the treaty together, such as the United States, Britain, France, ect.25
According to Orbán, the modern manifestation of these powers resides in Brussels at
the headquarters of the European Union, an institution of Western colonisation.26 While
the EU provides significant economic assistance to its member states including
Hungary, Mr. Orbán feels that this assistance comes with a cultural price, and the
Unions values of multiculturalism and liberal individual independence are significant
threats to his secular Christian state identity.
Viktor Orbán has not always been opposed to Hungary's involvement in
international coalitions with the West as he was Prime Minister when Hungary was
admitted into NATO in 1999. That said he campaigned strongly against Hungary’s
entrance into the EU, and in 2008 he and his supporters were finally given legitimate
ammunition to criticize the Union in the form of the economic meltdown prompted by the
global financial crisis. In his campaigns and speeches, Mr. Orbán has constantly
heaped blame for the economic catastrophe on the European Union and the United
States as well, claiming that the liberal, capitalist, and democratic values and institutions
which emerged in Hungary after the collapse of the Soviet Union was an attempt by the
West to colonize Hungary with their incompatible values and destroy the Hungarian
state and culture.27 To emphasize this point to the Hungarian people, Orbán frequently
references the difficulties faced in Western states, saying things along the lines of: “Not
everything is going well in the West, why should we follow them?”.28
Viktor Orbán’s most famous clash with the EU revolves around the immigration
policy of Angela Merkle in response to the refugee crisis in the Middle East, a crisis
25
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which Orbán likens to a cultural invasion. Invoking the old conflict between Christian
Hungarians and the Islamic Ottoman Empire in the East, Orbán has stated that the
wave of refugees being brought into Europe is the second coming of the Islamic
invasion of the Middle Ages, saying: “Migrants now seek to take what our ancestors
fought them for, to surrender (to the EU) will destroy [our Hungarian] world”.29 The
narrative that Orbán is trying to create is one in which the EU has sponsored the
destruction of Hungarian culture by means of a proxy army: the refugees fleeing to
Europe in search of a less violent existence. Using Hungary's conjured identity of a
fundamental Christian state as leverage to turn away the largely muslim migrants,
Orbán’s government have built barbed wire fences at the borders of the nation to keep
out any immigrants who might corrupt the culture of Hungary.30 Many of FIDESZ’s
campaign slogans promote this secular view of immigration, and express support for
Orbán’s defiance in the face of the EU.

Let’s Stop Brussels! National Consultation 2017 (photo: cyberpress.hu)
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Stop Migrants FIDESZ Billboard (Source Orange Files)
While Orbán’s attacks against the EU are dressed up in his mission to save
Hungary, it serves the dual purpose of legitimizing his illiberal regime and leadership to
Hungarians who have bought into his vision of Hungarian identity. By emphasizing the
historic injustices impartedon Hungary by the West and the disastrous consequences of
the financial crisis brought about by Western economic institutions, as well as the
Western sponsorship of the Islamic migrant invasion, Orbán seeks to convince
Hungarians that an illiberal regime is the only way to protect Hungary from the
encroaching threats which surround the nation and seek to destroy its ancient ways of
life. Similarly, Orbán has proven to the Hungarian people that he is willing to stand up to
the EU and go about business the “Hungarian way” rather than be bullied by the
superpowers as weaker leaders before him have. Thus by invoking the historical threats
of both Western liberalism and the ancient conflict between Christians and Muslims
which Hungary has historically played a large role, Mr. Orbán has closed the populist
circle by legitimizing his charismatic illiberal rule over a Hungarian population polarized
from their international neighbors.
In the formation of any national identity, ever present are events or narratives
present in the national history which can be particularly damaging or detrimental to the
character of this identity. As he has gone about restoring the national identity of
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Hungary, Viktor Orbán has reckoned with several influences and factors which undercut
Hungary’s commitment to a secular Christian identity. To circumvent these difficulties,
Orbán and FIDESZ have utilized traditional scapegoats to lessen Hungarian historical
guilt, emphasize Hungary’s role as a victim of history, and undermine anyone who
challenges his polarized picture of the past or any aspect of his view of national
Hungarian identity.
One of the greatest obstacles facing Viktor Orbán and his vision for Hungary is
that the values which he has promoted as fundamentally Hungarian have not always
been present in Hungarian history. The period of 1939 to 1945 come immediately to
mind, as during this period Hungary was a willing conspiritor with Nazi Germany and
remained one of its closest if incompitent military allies throughout the Second World
War. While the independent Hungarian government at the time did not participate in the
extermination of Europe’s Jewish population, they did provide ready military assistance
to the Nazis, and Hungarian troops fought on the Eastern Front. However in Viktor
Orbán’s eye, the idea that an independent Hungarian state supported a facist
movement is an unacceptable smudge on Hungarian national pride, and the narrative of
collaboration has been replaced by one of foreign occupation and subjugation by the
Nazis. To supplement this new narrative, in 2014 in a closed door meeting a monument
Memorial for Victims of the German Occupation was designed and constructed in
Budapest.31 A gross icon of historical manipulation and irresponsibility, the monument
shows Hungary as the Archangel Gabriel desperately warding off vicious attacks from
an eagle, meant to represent Nazi Germany. Of all of Orbán’s attempts to change
history for his own uses, this monument has seen the most significant public pushback,
and the monument in its current form still stands but has been covered in personal
mementos left by people who would not forget the horror of the Holocaust and the
legacy of that terrible war.32 This outcry aside, Mr. Orbán has made clear the position
that Hungarians should feel no sense of guilt or wrongdoing when they reflect on their
national history.
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While Orbán and FIDESZ have not looked to punish critics of the Occupation
Memorial, they have been significantly less kind to academics willing to challenge them
on other instances of historical mismanagement. For example, in the summer of 2020
Nóra Berend, a professor of history at Cambridge University and Hungarian national
was asked to review sections of Hungarian school textbooks by the Society of History
Teachers, a government sponsored society. Her review, titled “Little Hungarian
Mythology,” accused the textbooks of instilling Hungarian children with a conflated
sense of national pride derived from the glorious Hungarian past depicted in the
books.33 In response, both the Hungarian government and state sponsored researchers
began leveling attacks against her, challenging her credibility and stating that she was in
the pay of certain liberal billionaires who wanted to harm Hungary’s national spirit.34
Rather than engaging in constructive debate with academics who present alternate
perspectives to the government’s polarized view of history, the Orbán government has
turned these voices into scapegoats which can be utilized as threats to the national
mission.
In any discussion of historical scapegoats in Europe it is impossible to avoid
discussing the difficulties faced by Jewish people and the stigma which historically
surrounded them. It should therefore come as little surprise that in Orbán’s Christian
state Jews have come under fire, taking on the role of the liberal denizens who promote
immigration which is meant to destroy traditional Hungarian culture.35 Traditionally Jews
have lived on the fringes of Hungarian society, and this unfamiliarity has caused Jews to
historically be blamed for the trials of the Hungarian people. Following the second World
War, Jew’s role in society shifted dramatically, and as Communism wrapped up
Hungary, the Hungarian people began to conflate Jewish identity with that of the
Communists, with both being viewed as untrustworthy.36 This conflation continued after
the fall of the Soviet Union, and today Jews in Hungary have come to represent the
forces of liberal multiculturalism which Orbán claims is hellbent on destroying Hungarian
culture.
33

Balogh, “Hungarian Spectrum,”
Ibid
35
Gabor Forgacs, The Orange Files, https://theorangefiles.hu.
36
Karpalski 44
34

16

The most prominent scapegoated figure is that of George Soros, a Jewish
Hungarian billionaire with close ties to the United States. Since the end of Communism
in Hungary, Mr. Soros has been Hungary's greatest sponsor of liberal style education,
supporting and funding a significant number of educational institutions inside Hungary,
notably Central European University, a private research university founded by Mr. Soros
in 1991. Despite being hailed as one of the most prestigious universities in all of
Europe, CEU was bombarded by attacks from Orbán and his supporters, who claimed
that “Soros University” was corrupting Hungary with its Jewish Liberal influence.37 The
attacks reached their zenith in 2017, when a law was passed restricting foreign
researchers in Hungary and all but forcing CEU out of Hungary all together.38 CEU
currently operates its main campus out of Vienna, Austria, and has almost no influence
inside of Hungary. Perhaps the University’s vested interest in research around
nationalism and historical memory might have prompted this abrupt exit? We may never
know.
Mr. Soros has been the target of the Hungarian government over another
prominent contemporary issue, that of immigration. Being a vocal supporter of both the
EU and immigration, the Orbán government have created an entire anti-immigration
campaign focusing of Mr. Soros. In 2017 FIDESZ ran a “Stop Soros” campaign which
eventually culminated in a “STOP Soros” law on immigration which classified the
“promotion of illegal immigration” as a misdemenor punishable by a prison sentence.39
“The STOP Soros legislation serves this purpose by making the organization of illegal
immigration a punishable offense. Through this proposed legislation, we want to prevent
Hungary from becoming a country of immigration.” said FIDESZ Interior Minister Sándor
Pintér in 2018.40
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Screen shot from Orbán government “STOP SOROS! television advertisement.
Since 2010, Hungary has undergone an astonishing transformation into an
illiberal regime, and the success which Viktor Orbán’s plan to take control of Hungarian
national identity achieved in a relatively short period of time echoes the achievements of
other prominent Populists such as Huey Long. Simultaneously, Hungary’s desertion of
democratic values and institutions is an anomaly in democratic political theory, as
competitive elections and international pressure usually result in further democratization
rather than backsliding.41 Given that Populism is generally conceived as an economic
phenomenon indicating the polarization of economic classes, it follows that much of the
analysis of Orbán’s illiberal rise focuses on the disastrous outcome of the 2008 financial
crisis and the anger which emanated from that catastrophe. However Populism in
Hungary goes beyond this surface analysis because rather than being an isolated
economic side effect, Populism has become a combined political, cultural and economic
force inside of Hungary.42
Above all else, Mr. Orbán must be seen as an opportunist who seeks to harness
wherever the most prominent national sentiment might be and use it to leverage
election success. In 2009 Mr. Orbán was one of the first people to grasp the rising anger
of the Hungarian people in response to the global financial crisis, and he redirected it
outward towards the western liberals who had laid out the blueprint for the economic
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system which had just horribly failed. Simultaneously, Orbán understood that Hungary
was undergoing an identity crisis which had plagued it since the fall of the Soviet Union,
when Hungarian culture all but vanished under the Communist dictatorship. As the new
Hungarian state emerged in 1989, the nation’s leaders needed to design a stable
system of government which would immediately and permanently and stabley function.
Their failures to design such a system resulted in the co-optation of Western style
capitalist democracy into Hungary which left a void of identity, and aware of this void
Orbán has inserted himself and his illiberal vision.
After the Revolution of 1956 which resulted in the Soviet military occupation of
Budapest and the execution of the revolutions leader Imre Nagy, nationalism in Hungary
waned dramatically. Hungarian intellectuals silenced their dissent and went into quiet
exile, making due with concessions offered under “Goulash Communism” rather than
endanger themselves in futile attempts at change.43 While the revolution sparked
feelings of national unity, the Soviets snuffed out this optimism, and Hungarian’s living
outside the borders of Hungary felt that they had lost their national identity. This feeling
was enforced by the Communist government’s denial of the existence of Hungarian
ethnic minorities outside of the country, since the national pressures which
acknowledged those minorities were equivocated to a facist dream by the Soviets.44
When the Soviet Union fell, these intellectuals were called upon to recreate the
Hungarian state from the top down, yet because the Soviets had refused to allow any
revival of Hungarian nationalism, these intellectuals and their compatriots in the new
Post-Communist states failed to imagine a unique system, settling on the raw
importation of Western style democracies with capitalist based market economies.
Thus when the system collapsed in 2008 and people desperately wondered what
had gone wrong, Viktor Orbán was poised to step in and direct their anger towards the
Westerners who had historically run roughshod over Hungary, rather than the failures of
the transitional government to create a sustainable system for Hungary.45 Liberals had
no response to Orbán’s nationalism, and the institutions which might prevent the rise of
43

Andras Bozoki, “The Hungarian Democratic Opposition: Self-Reflection, Identity, and Political
Discourse,” Political Science.ceu, 2007. 6
44
Bozoki “The Hungarian Democratic Opposition”. 17
45
Ivan Krastev and Stephen Holmes, The Light That Failed: A Reckoning (London: Penguin Books,
2020). 23

19

illiberalism were not suitably entrenched in Hungarian society and culture to deal with
the power of this revived nationalism. To Orbán, the source of nationalism was not the
most significant factor as he has demonstrated that Hungarian national identity can be
conjured from myths and legends as much from history, but rather this backwards
looking identity polarizes Hungarians from their present circumstances.
The most significant characteristic of Mr. Orbán’s vision of Hungarian identity is
that it relies on a history without any living historical memory. The history which living
Hungarians do remember is that of the decline of Hungarian nationalism under Soviet
rule, and most would rather forget that. Meanwhile intellectuals who might have fostered
a history worth celebrating during that time were in hiding and therefore have no
standing credibility with modern Hungarians, as those intellectuals have been accused
by Orbán and his government of betraying the interests of Hungarians. Orbán’s rise
therefore has been nearly unopposed, and Orbán can conjure a lost vocation for
Hungary without any fear of opposition. While the world changed and obsolete
ideologies faded and were replaced, the values of the past could be repurposed, but not
abandoned.
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